This chapter argues that political competition in new democracies can play an important role in the formation, implementation and sustainability of anti-poverty programmes. Much of the current literature on the determinants of policy success stresses that politics matters. However, politics in this context is usually discussed with reference to hard-to-specify concepts (such as political leadership), to the indirect effects of democracy (such as transparency and the increased flow of public information) or to increased civic engagement and popular participation. While I recognize that in some contexts these factors do play a role in explaining development success and institutional change, public policy decisions are primarily made by political actors in formal political institutions who are driven by concerns with political survival. In democracies this essentially means the ability to win elections. This statement is a truism for established industrial democracies, but is a neglected dimension in current analyses of public policy in developing countries. Most authors who focus on domestic politics in new democracies have focused on how the electoral process is governed by a clientelistic logic that undermines efforts at reforming existing programmes or introducing new programmes (for Brazil see Samuels, 2003) . Political competition is seldom viewed in a positive light.
To advance these arguments, the chapter discusses a case of policy success in which political competition played a crucial role. The case in question is the Bolsa Escola programme in Brazil, a poverty reduction programme introduced under the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) and continuing to the present. This widely acclaimed conditional cash-transfer programme, which according to the World Bank 'became a well known trade mark and export of Brazilian social policy', 1 illustrates how political competition has generated policy emulation in sub-national governments that in turn has influenced policy at the national level. Thus political competition engendered policy emulation and policy transfer and led ultimately to the scaling up of local initiatives.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section briefly reviews arguments found in the current literature on policy reforms. The second section discusses the issue of policy diffusion and explores its link with political competition. The two subsequent sections describe the political and social context of the Cardoso government in Brazil, and go on to analyze the emergence and evolution of the Bolsa Escola programme as a case of policy success which is partly explained by that context. The Bolsa Escola programme has been scaled up and survived a major shift in government when the Lula government was elected in 2002, and thus has passed the test of durability (McCourt and Bebbington, Chapter 1, this volume). Starting at the municipal level, in 1994, through a number of experiments by mayors, the programme has been scaled up through various steps and is now universal in coverage, having in its current model, the Bolsa Família, 10 million recipients as of mid-2006. Its impact on schooling and nutrition is also significant (Bourguignon et al., 2003) .
Explaining policy success: the political survival imperative
The limitations of the policy reform literature Governance institutions and domestic politics have attracted a lot of attention in the development and public policy literature in the 1980s and 1990s. That institutions and politics matter is now the conventional wisdom. Even the traditionally cautious multilateral institutions have abandoned their earlier naïvety -at least in their position papers and public statements -and now recognize that political elites are key actors in the policy process (Nelson, 2000) . However, the existing literature on policy reform and policy success tends to subsume politics in terms of difficult-to-specify concepts such as political will, political leadership or political commitment. It also usually cites lack of institutional endowments and capacity as the reason why programmes fail. But political will can be a scapegoat that multilateral
